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In mid-March, both Brazil and Argentina announced new economic measures to calm their
turbulent financial markets, which have been relentlessly battered since December by the ripple
effect of the Mexican financial crisis. Throughout the first half of March, the value of trade on the
large South American stock markets continued to plunge. The decline has been almost nonstop
since Mexico devalued its currency last Dec. 20 fSourceMex, 03/08/95 and 03/15/95). The decision
to devalue the peso rattled the region's financial markets as nervous investors in stocks and bonds
scrambled to sell off their holdings out of fear that Mexico's currency crisis could trigger similar
problems in the other countries (see NotiSur, 01/12/95, 02/02/95, and 02/23/95).
During the first week of March, the drop in trade on the South American markets accelerated,
largely because Mexico's ongoing political and economic difficulties led to a further plunge in the
value of the peso at the beginning of the month. That, in turn, spurred another round of panicked
sell-offs by investors in the other regional markets. By March 5, the Brazilian and Argentine
stock markets had both registered cumulative drops of nearly 50% since the peso crisis began in
December.
Even in Chile one of the most stable economies in the region the Santiago Stock Market's leading
index "IPSA" has registered an accumulated decline of more than 23% since the beginning of the
year. As a result, in mid-March both Brazil and Argentina announced new economic measures
to stabilize their financial markets and restore confidence among foreign and domestic investors,
although the actions taken by each country are very different.
In Brazil, the government has decided to ease its control over the currency exchange rate as part of
a new policy of periodic mini-devaluations. By slowly but steadily permitting the local currency to
slide in value against the dollar, the government hopes to eliminate the overvaluation of the real,
thus allowing Brazil to avoid the painful effects of a sudden, major shift in the exchange rate, which
is what pushed Mexico into crisis. The real has been trading at about 0.85 per US$1.00 since last
July, when the government launched its economic stabilization plan, dubbed the Plan Real. The
central measure of the stabilization plan which has reduced monthly inflation in Brazil from about
50% before the plan took effect to under 2% at present is the decision to maintain the real at a parity
with the dollar, although the currency has actually remained stronger than the dollar since the new
monetary unit began circulating last July.
Nevertheless, the real is now estimated to be overvalued by as much as 25% because the exchange
rate has not been adjusted to account for accumulated inflation since July. The government has
artificially maintained the real's strength by drawing on the country's huge pool of foreign reserves,
estimated at about US$43 billion as of last December, before the Mexican financial crisis began.
Until now, the government allowed the real to float up and down in a fixed trading band of between
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved.

Page 1 of 4

LADB Article Id: 56214
ISSN: 1060-4189

0.82 and 0.85 per US$1.00. Whenever dollar demand pushed the real to the top of the band, the
Central Bank would intervene by selling dollars. The government's refusal to alter the trading band
to compensate for the real's overvaluation was a central reason for the plunge in Brazil's stock
markets after the Mexican crisis exploded.
Investors feared that, as in Mexico, Brazil's foreign reserves eventually would be depleted if it
continued to artificially shore up local currency, especially because the overvaluation of the real had
pushed the country toward huge monthly trade deficits since November that could rapidly devour
Brazil's reserves if measures were not taken to correct the problem. In February, for example, the
monthly trade deficit reached US$1.2 billion the largest in the country's history bringing Brazil's
accumulated trade deficit for the past four months to nearly US$3 billion.
Notwithstanding the recent monthly trade deficits, government officials still believe that the nation
will achieve a trade surplus during the first semester of this year. But the surplus is only expected
to reach US$800 million, representing a small fraction of the US$7 billion surplus recorded during
the first semester of 1994, before the real-dollar parity was established. In February most economists
warned that the current account deficit would grow to between US$8 billion and US$10 billion
this year compared with just US$1 billion in 1994 unless the government took steps to correct the
problem. Investor concerns that Brazil would eventually follow the same path as Mexico deplete its
reserves, suddenly be forced to devalue local currency, and then find itself short of the necessary
capital to cover foreign debt obligations greatly encouraged the run on Brazil's stock markets since
December, which, in turn, increased the pressure to devalue the real.
Brazil's foreign reserves now stand at about US$35 billion, about US$8 billion less than when the
Mexican financial crisis exploded. As a result, on March 7 the government raised the currency
trading band to between 0.86 and 0.90 per US$1.00, and it announced that in May the band would
be raised again to between 0.90 and 0.98 per US$1.00, in effect representing a new policy of minidevaluations aimed at slowly eliminating the currency overvaluation. Still, rather than calm
financial markets, at first the new policy had an adverse reaction, ushering in a new wave of
panicked investor sell-offs on the Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro stock markets. In part, the plunge
in trade reflected the belief among many investors that the feared "domino phenomenon" of
South American countries falling one-by-one into currency crises like Mexico's had now begun.
Those jitters, however, were greatly aggravated by currency speculators who hoped to push the
government to devalue the real much faster. In the first two days of trading after the government
announced the new exchange rate band, the Bovespa index for the Sao Paulo stock exchange
plunged by 12.74%, and the Rio de Janeiro market plummeted 8.9%.
The panic in Brazil had a ripple effect on neighboring markets as well, with Argentina's Merval
index dropping 7.7% on March 7, and Chile's IPSA declining 2.16% that same day. In response, on
March 9 the government announced more measures to encourage investors to keep their capital
in the country. Among other things, the government sharply raised monthly interest rates, from
4.4% to 6%; it cut taxes for foreigners investing in Brazil's stock markets; and it announced plans to
sell US$10 billion in new debt indexed to the dollar. At the same time, the Central Bank massively
intervened in the exchange market on March 9 and 10, selling off about US$3 billion in reserves
to shore up the real. These moves reversed the slide on Brazil's stock markets. On March 10, for
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example, the Sao Paulo Bovespa index rebounded by a whopping 25.6%. "The sudden plunge on
the market was basically a speculative attack against the Central Bank," said the bank's president,
Persio Arida.
"But we have enough resources to uphold the trading band, and we will use them whenever
necessary." Meanwhile, in Argentina President Carlos Menem's administration has announced
an emergency economic plan to calm the country's turbulent financial markets. In large part, the
plunge in trade on the domestic stock markets was brought on by investor fear that the government
had become lax in its fiscal and monetary policies, causing a projected US$3 billion fiscal deficit for
this year, the first such deficit since the Menem administration launched its economic stabilization
plan in April 1991.
Like Brazil's Plan Real, the Argentine stabilization program dubbed the convertibility plan is based
on the establishment of a fixed exchange rate that placed local currency on a parity with the US
dollar. To maintain the parity, the government is required by law to match at all times the total
number of pesos in circulation with an equal amount of foreign reserves, which are held in the
Central Bank. At the same time, the government has until now exercised strict fiscal and monetary
discipline to control inflation, thereby alleviating pressures to devalue local currency. Nevertheless,
the appearance of a huge fiscal deficit this year generated fear in the domestic and foreign business
community that inflation would begin to climb again in 1995, undermining the government's ability
to maintain the peso- dollar parity.
Most independent economists believe that local currency is overvalued, which, in turn, has
generated a monumental trade deficit that reached a record US$6 billion in 1994. And, just as in
Mexico until the devaluation last December, Argentina has largely financed its deficits with soft
loans from foreign investors. As a result, investors feared that Argentina would soon be forced to
discard the convertibility plan and devalue local currency in the next few months, which could push
the country into a financial crisis similar to Mexico's. Such fears encouraged nervous domestic and
foreign investors to withdraw more than US$4 billion in peso deposits from Argentina's banking
system since December. In addition, the Central Bank's foreign reserves have dropped by US$2
billion, from US$17 billion to US$15 billion, as the government has been forced to sell dollars to
shore up the peso. The run on deposits has, in turn, created a severe liquidity crisis, pushing interest
rates above 50% and forcing the government to revise its growth predictions for 1995 from the 6%
expansion originally anticipated to between 2% and 3%.
The Argentine government's new austerity plan, then, brought welcome relief to the country's
battered financial markets, since domestic and foreign investors immediately expressed their
support for the new measures. The plan is generally broken into two parts. On the one hand,
the government will immediately reel in public spending, increase taxes, and accelerate the
privatization of some large assets that remain in state hands. All told, the Menem administration
estimates that those measures will invert the estimated US$3 billion deficit to a budget surplus of
US$4.4 billion by the end of the year. On the other hand, the government has negotiated a package
of new loans from multilateral lending institutions, commercial banks, and domestic and foreign
investors that total US$6.7 billion. That, combined with the US$4.4 billion surplus expected during
the year, will increase by US$11.1 billion the amount of funds available to the government to
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maintain the peso-dollar parity and meet its debt obligations this year. About US$5.2 billion in debt
to bond holders is scheduled to come due in 1995, plus US$3.6 billion in interest.
"We now have an additional US$11.1 billion that will allow us to ratify convertibility, that is, the
backing in gold and foreign currencies of Argentina's money, to ensure the timely payment of
US$5.2 billion in debt maturing in 1995," said Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo, who was the
architect of the original convertibility plan. In addition, the plan will stave off a collapse of the
banking system, bringing down interest rates and making loans available again to consumers and
the business sector. "The fundamental goal is to quickly create credit again for Argentina, but
especially credit for Argentina's private sector," said Cavallo.
As in Brazil, the announcement of new economic measures immediately reversed the slide on
Argentina's stock markets. On Friday March 10, the day the government announced the plan, the
Merval index suddenly jumped 12.8%. And, on the following business day, Monday March 13, the
index climbed by another 8.23% for a total gain of 21% during those two days. In fact, the upswing
on the Brazilian and Argentine markets had a direct effect on neighboring Chile. On March 10,
the Santiago market registered a 9.4% gain the biggest increase in eight years. Still, the effort to
stabilize the financial markets will represent huge social costs in Brazil and Argentina, where lower
income groups have already suffered under the weight of structural adjustment in recent years. In
Argentina in particular the new emergency economic program contains painful austerity measures,
such as an increase in taxes charged to consumers, a cut in pay for many civil servants, and a slash in
the country's few remaining welfare programs, such as unemployment benefits.
"Argentina is going through an extremely critical moment, not only on the economic front, but on
the social front," said Domingo Cavallo. Moreover, it is not yet clear if the financial roller coaster set
in motion by the Mexican crisis has come to a halt. The announcement of an emergency stabilization
plan in Mexico in mid-March did largely calm regional markets. But it remains to be seen if Mexico
is capable of implementing the program, and the increasing political instability in that country
could continue to affect regional financial markets for a long time to come. (Sources: Inter Press
Service, 03/02/95; Notimex, 03/01/95, 03/09/95, 03/10/95, 03/13/95; Voice of America, 03/03/95,
03/10/95; United Press International, 03/10/95; Washington Post, 03/12/95; Spanish news service
EFE, 03/09/95, 03/11/95, 03/12/95; Deutsche Press Agentur, 03/06/95, 03/07/95, 03/13/95; New York
Times, 02/23/95, 03/07/95, 03/08/95, 03/10/95, 03/11/95, 03/13/95, 03/14/95; Reuter, 02/28/95, 03/02/95,
03/06/95, 03/10/95, 03/13/95, 03/14/95; Agence France-Presse, 03/06-08/95, 03/10/95, 03/11/95,
03/13/95, 03/14/95; Associated Press, 03/09/95, 03/14/95, 03/15/95)
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